Addressing tobacco industry influence in tobacco-growing countries

Abstract Protecting policy-making from tobacco industry influence is central to effective tobacco control governance. The inclusion of industry actors as stakeholders in policy processes remains a crucial avenue to corporate influence. This influence is reinforced by the idea that the tobacco industry is a legitimate partner to government in regulatory governance. Addressing the influence of the tobacco industry demands a focus on the government institutions that formalize relationships between industry and policy-makers. Industry involvement in government institutions is particularly relevant in tobacco-growing countries, where sectors of government actively support tobacco as an economic commodity. In this paper, we discuss how controlling tobacco industry influence requires unique consideration in tobacco-growing countries. In these countries, there is a diverse array of companies that support tobacco production, including suppliers of seeds, equipment and chemicals, as well as transportation, leaf buying and processing, and manufacturing companies. The range of companies that operate in these contexts is particular and so is their engagement within political institutions. For governments wanting to support alternatives to tobacco growing (Article 17 of the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control), we illustrate how implementing Article 5.3, aimed at protecting tobacco control policies from tobacco industry interference, is fundamental in these countries. Integrating Article 5.3 with Article 17 will (i) strengthen policy coherence, ensuring that alternative livelihood policies are not undermined by tobacco industry interference; (ii) foster cross-sector collaboration addressing both tobacco industry interference and livelihood development; and (iii) enhance accountability and transparency in tobacco control efforts.

cies from tobacco industry interference in tobacco-growing countries, requires consideration of this unique context.We argue that Article 5.3 is foundational to the pursuit of Article 17 of the FCTC.Simultaneously, the implementation of Article 5.3 must be tailored to accommodate the intricacies of industry-government relationships within the distinct institutional contexts of these countries.

Tobacco-growing countries Tobacco industry
In tobacco-growing countries, what constitutes the tobacco industry is unique.There exists a diverse array of companies supporting tobacco production.Therefore, these countries require unique considerations when examining and addressing the influence of the tobacco industry.The deep integration of tobacco industry interests along the supply chain serves as an important driver of pro-tobacco agendas. 3,13hile cigarette companies drive the supply of tobacco leaf, the supply chain itself has several levels of companies that facilitate this supply.In addition to cigarette companies like British American Tobacco or Philip Morris International, there are companies that supply tobacco growers with essentials, including barn materials, tools and equipment, tobacco seeds, fertilizers, chemicals and packaging materials.There are also transportation companies and other services that support tobacco supply.Each of these suppliers has a vested interest in tobacco as an economic commodity.Often, these companies are interconnected along the supply chain through leaf-buying companies.5][16][17][18] These companies often procure and distribute inputs like seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides, and manage the transportation of leaf to market. 19,20

Tobacco governance
Various ministries and agencies oversee the tobacco supply chain; however, their collective objective often leans towards maintaining tobacco as an economic commodity. 3,21,22A notable component of this institutional oversight is the presence of tobacco boards.These boards have diverse membership, including ministries of agriculture, commerce, finance, and industry as well as farmer associations. 23he boards are responsible for overseeing the grading scheme that determines the correlation between quality and price, managing the auction system and handling other aspects related to the sale of tobacco leaf.Importantly, these boards have an explicit mandate to promote, protect and maintain the production, sale and preparation for subsequent use and export of tobacco. 24The following statement from the Tobacco Board of Zambia illustrates how these institutions are committed to tobacco, and resist shifts away from tobacco growing: "Any attempt to stop tobacco production will simply enhance poverty in the rural household[s] that depend on tobacco production for their livelihood." Included in the institutional network are other important agencies like government-supported research agencies with the mandate to support the technical aspects of tobacco growing, and commissions that have a mandate to regulate the production and marketing of tobacco. 25mportantly, this network of institutions harbours both formal and informal ties with the tobacco industry.For example, in Malawi, a major tobacco-growing country, the Agricultural Research and Extension Trust has two members of the agriculture ministry sitting next to one representative from the tobacco industry and four representatives from the Tobacco Association of Malawi, an association with linkages to the International Tobacco Growers Association. 13,26he interaction between government and industry is explicitly supported by these associations and agencies.For example, when addressing challenges posed by the expanding tobacco control movement, the chief executive officer of the Agricultural Research and Extension Trust mentioned "through continued interaction with various stakeholders we continue to get important feedback which helps us surmount the challenges and achieve our goals." 27n important part of the challenge of preventing tobacco industry influence stems from the efforts of influential transnational tobacco companies to normalize their products and practices. 28or example, a leaked 10-year strategic plan from Philip Morris International in 2014 revealed that a key strategy for the company is to "build on existing, and foster future, stakeholder relations with international organizations, politicians … etc. to further expand communications and engagement opportunities." 29hilip Morris International has funded the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World which is active in Malawi, partnering with the government to promote the idea that the tobacco industry can be a constructive player in seeking alternatives to tobacco cultivation.This intricate network of relationships between tobacco industry interests and the government not only sustains tobacco supply but also creates avenues for the industry to oppose tobacco control.The 10-year plan captures this dynamic explicitly, where Philip Morris International has outlined a primary objective: to "proactively increase our stakeholder base to equip us to better shape the future sales environment" and make it "politically unattractive to implement excessive sales regulations/restrictions … via engaging directly with policy-makers, media and third parties." 29 Similar initiatives can be observed at the International Labour Organization, where the major tobacco companies partnered to position themselves as champions of the anti-child labour movement.By doing so, they aim to gain favour with governments and attempt to portray themselves as legitimate partners. 30In countries, such as China and Thailand, where the government often exercises direct and comprehensive control over tobacco supply, transnational companies still maintain involvement at various stages along the supply chain.Box 1 presents the complex dynamic involved even when the Thai government has direct control over supply.
These examples illustrate the intricate interweaving of government-industry relationships within the institutional frameworks in tobacco-growing countries.The examples further underscore that the dynamic isn't merely about the connections between government and industry, but also about the mandates that both validate and reinforce these relationships. 37These institutional dynamics influence the ability of health ministries to garner support from other sectors when implementing the multisectoral provisions of the FCTC.Considering tobacco industry interests as stakeholders in government decision-making enables commercial entities to influence governmental actions.In many tobacco-growing countries, FCTC-compliant tobacco legislation has largely stalled due to the influence of economic arguments and Bull World Health Organ 2024;102:58-64| doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.23.290219   Addressing tobacco industry influence in tobacco-growing countries Raphael A Lencucha et al.
interests.The tireless efforts by champions within government and tobacco control advocates have faced resistance from the powerful economic sector, which consistently contends that tobacco plays a crucial role in the country's economic development. 21,38plementing Article 17 To safeguard the health and livelihoods of tobacco farmers, workers and their communities, Article 17 of the FCTC requires Parties to promote economically viable alternatives: "Parties shall, in cooperation with each other and with competent international and regional intergovernmental organizations, promote, as appropriate, economically viable alternatives for tobacco workers, growers and, as the case may be, individual sellers." Implementing Article 17 aligns with several sustainable development goals (SDGs), including SDG 1 (reducing poverty), SDG 3 (improving health and well-being), SDG 5 (promoting gender equality), SDG 8 (ensuring decent work and employment), SDG 12 (encouraging responsible consumption and production) and SDG 15 (protecting life on land). 39Many governments have initiated programmes that support alternatives to tobacco growing.For example, in 2017, the Brazilian National Programme of Diversification in Tobacco-Growing Areas supported 11 000 families in six tobacco-growing states to diversify their livelihoods, and protect the health of tobacco farmers and natural resources in their communities.In 2000, Malaysia introduced kenaf as an alternative to tobacco.The Malaysian government provided financial incentives for inputs and mechanization support to kenaf growers, which increased the kenaf cultivation area to 1364 hectares, with a total of 928 kenaf growers, in 2020. 40Despite these efforts by countries where tobacco is grown, Article 17 remains one of the least-implemented obligations of the WHO FCTC. 40

Implementing Article 5.3
The FCTC is distinctive among framework conventions in its recognition of the potential for an industry to undermine its objectives.Article 5.3 is a policy instrument within the FCTC, designed to protect policy-making from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry. 41Within the general obligations of Article 5.3, the guidelines call on all departments within government to be accountable to the principles that protect tobacco control from industry influence.For instance, the guidelines state that "Any government branch (executive, legislative and judiciary) responsible for setting and implementing tobacco control policies and for protecting those policies against tobacco industry interests should be accountable." 42 Article 5.3, as a policy tool, comprises both procedural and substantive guidelines aimed at establishing and maintaining a specific model of regulatory governance.Procedural guidelines are those designed to shape the internal workings of government and how the government interacts with non-state actors.These guidelines are designed to limit interactions between public officials and the tobacco industry, ensuring any necessary engagements are conducted transparently and with accountability.Substantive guidelines are those used to affect policy outcomes such as regulation or subsidies 43 and shape the political economy of the tobacco industry, including the removal of tax exemptions and restrictions on state investment in the tobacco industry.These procedural and substantive guidelines are designed to be complementary, with decision-making procedures supporting the pursuit of substantive goals such as reducing the supply of tobacco.
While Article 5.3 has been framed as the backbone of the FCTC, 44 its relevance to the implementation of other articles within the treaty remains underexplored, especially for Article 17. Articles 5.3 and 17 are related in their focus on the political economy of tobacco production.As noted, the guidelines for the implementation of Article 5.3 require governments to avoid preferential treatment and introduce mechanisms to remove incentives to the tobacco industry. 42In relation to Article 17, these rules and tools apply to all actors along the tobacco supply chain, such as the trade associations and leaf buyers.
The status of Article 5.3 as a general obligation of the FCTC means that it applies to all sectors of government, with political institutions across trade, finance and agriculture subject to its norms, rules and procedures.The article contains procedures that are designed to shape how government, as a whole, interacts with the tobacco industry and also frames the use of other instruments.In theory, Article 5.3 should shape the use of other procedural instruments, such as stakeholder consultation, commissions and advisory committees, according to its normative goal of protecting policy-making from Box 1.The tobacco system in Thailand: state control, corporate influence and farmers' predicament In Thailand, the tobacco system consists of four major entities: the finance ministry, Tobacco Authority of Thailand, tobacco farmers and multinational tobacco companies.By law, the finance ministry governs the entire tobacco system, which includes the licensing and registration for tobacco growing, leaf purchasing, tobacco manufacturing, and the sale, import and export of tobacco products. 31Tobacco Authority of Thailand, a state-owned company under the finance ministry, is the only legal entity authorized to produce cigarettes in the country.Furthermore, Tobacco Authority of Thailand has developed a tobacco contract farming system and holds the authority to assign tobacco quotas to local farmers. 32While private tobacco companies are not allowed to grow or manufacture tobacco in Thailand, they engage in the process by collaborating with local curing firms and establishing their own contract farming system for leaf purchasing and export.Multinational tobacco companies have a long-standing relationship with Thai tobacco farmers.
The 1990-1992 action plan from Philip Morris explicitly aimed to identify Thai farmers' groups and promote their membership in the International Tobacco Growers' Association, a tobacco industry front group. 33Thailand Tobacco Growers' Association is currently a member of International Tobacco Growers' Association.Moreover, Philip Morris International has donated to Thai tobacco farmers through various projects.In 2022, Philip Morris International funded to multiple tobacco farming associations for projects such as scholarship programs for the children of tobacco growers, and capacity-building training sessions for female tobacco farmers. 34Many of these tobacco farmer groups have opposed certain tobacco control measures, like tobacco taxes and ingredient regulations, citing economic repercussions. 35otwithstanding the robust ties between the Tobacco Farmers' Association and the multinational tobacco industry, nearly 60% of local Thai tobacco farmers have expressed a desire to cease tobacco cultivation. This challenge stems not only from the need to shift from established governance mechanisms and practices, but also from the deeply rooted institutional structures granting the tobacco industry formal access to government. 8o implement Article 5.3 in tobaccogrowing contexts requires understanding the sites of connection between industry and government, as illustrated above.One starting point is the establishment of multisectoral coordinating mechanisms as required by Article 5.2 of the Convention.These coordinating mechanisms have important potential not only to shape the operations of all sectors of government in the implementation of FCTC provisions, but also to shift the norms of industrygovernment relations.Often these mechanisms illustrate existing tensions in the governance norms held by different sectors.In the Philippines, the Interagency Committee-Tobacco was created as part of the Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 and is the sole body charged with implementing the Act. 12The Department of Trade and Industry, whose mandate has involved support for the tobacco industry, chairs the Interagency Committee-Tobacco.The committee also includes the National Tobacco Administration, which is mandated by law to promote the development of the tobacco industry on the agriculture side.Additionally, the Philippine Tobacco Institute, which represents the tobacco industry, is a part of thecommittee.The Philippine Tobacco Institute has filed suits against the Department of Health for their tobacco control efforts, leading civil society organizations to pursue a campaign to remove them from the Interagency Committee-Tobacco. 46The situation with the National Commission for FCTC Implementation in Brazil presents a nuanced parallel.While the health sector leads the commission, the inclusion of the ministry of agribusiness in the thirteen-ministry coordinating mechanism poses challenges to tobacco control efforts.Participants in a study on this national commission noted that the ministry of agribusiness worked closely with tobacco companies, with a mandate to support these companies. 47hese examples illustrate, the potential of Article 5.3 to reorient industry-government relations towards supply and demand reduction.They also highlight the challenges that arise when government sectors view tobacco as an economic commodity.

Conclusion
Addressing the interactions between the tobacco industry and governments in tobacco-growing countries presents unique challenges.However, addressing these challenges is essential if governments are to effectively implement Article 17 and other provisions of the FCTC.To pursue Article 5.3, Parties need to understand the unique institutional landscape within tobacco-growing countries, especially where the industry interacts with government.Many industry actors that support tobacco production and who sit next to government representatives on agencies are not directly tobacco companies.The range of companies with a stake in tobacco growing is broad, and many of the companies interacting with government in relation to tobacco supply are generic agricultural suppliers that could contribute to the pursuit of alternatives to tobacco growing.The 2021 report, A multi-billion dollar opportunity: repurposing agricultural support to transform food systems, published by the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Environment Programme, outlines how such agencies and other entities along the agricultural supply chain can be repurposed to pursue food systems transformation. 48The recommendations stem from problems associated with current food systems, including the erosion of environments and the concentration of economic benefit with large companies, leaving growers with meagre earnings or debt.These same conditions exist along the tobacco supply chain where farmers earn little to nothing, while cigarette companies generate massive profits. 49,50The 2021 report 48 highlights that, even amid the complexities inherent in agribusiness systems, there exists a significant opportunity to leverage existing institutions and infrastructure to advocate for food systems that are more equitable, environmentally sustainable and community-focused.
Implementing Article 5.3 in tobaccogrowing countries has important implications for controlling industry influence and transforming the political economy of tobacco supply.Mapping the industry's location and understanding its characteristics along the supply chain will be important for identifying which agricultural suppliers are not strictly tobacco companies, but currently have a stake in maintaining support for tobacco production.To shift such companies to other crops requires a shift in institutional mandates away from supporting tobacco growing.Mandates need to support alternatives to tobacco, and work with companies that currently aid agricultural production to support the pursuit of Article 17.These efforts to shift mandates and support alternatives to tobacco requires that leaf-buying companies, as well as those that process and manufacture tobacco, be excluded from governments' agendasetting efforts from the outset.The fact that the tobacco industry is represented alongside government sectors serves to maintain the emphasis on tobacco as an important economic commodity. 51n conclusion, Parties to the FCTC need to disengage from the tobacco industry, including leaf-buying companies and other companies along the supply chain.By doing so, Parties should consider integrating Article 5.3 with Article 17 of the FCTC in the formulation of policies related to economically sustainable alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers.The integration of Article 5.3 with Article 17 will (i) strengthen policy coherence that ensures alternative livelihood policies are not undermined by tobacco industry interference; (ii) support cross-sector collaboration, addressing both tobacco industry interference and the development of livelihoods; and (iii) enhance accountability and transparency in tobacco control efforts.

Resumen Lucha contra la influencia de la industria tabacalera en los países productores de tabaco
Proteger la formulación de políticas contra la influencia de la industria tabacalera es fundamental para una gobernanza eficaz del control del tabaco.La inclusión de los actores de la industria como partes interesadas en los procesos políticos sigue siendo una vía crucial para la influencia corporativa.Esta influencia se ve reforzada por la idea de que la industria tabacalera es un asociado legítimo del gobierno en la gobernanza reglamentaria.La lucha contra la influencia de la industria tabacalera exige centrarse en las instituciones gubernamentales que formalizan las relaciones entre la industria y los responsables de formular políticas.La participación de la industria en las instituciones gubernamentales es especialmente relevante en los países productores de tabaco, donde algunos sectores del gobierno apoyan activamente el tabaco como un bien económico.En este documento, se analiza cómo el control de la influencia de la industria tabacalera requiere una consideración especial en los países productores de tabaco.En estos países, existe una gran variedad de empresas que apoyan la producción de tabaco, incluidos los proveedores de semillas, equipos y productos químicos, así como las empresas de transporte, de compra de hojas y de procesamiento y fabricación.La variedad de empresas que operan en estos contextos es particular y también lo es su compromiso dentro de las instituciones políticas.Para los gobiernos que desean apoyar alternativas al cultivo de tabaco (es decir, el artículo 17 del Convenio Marco para el Control del Tabaco), se ilustra cómo la aplicación del artículo 5.3, destinado a proteger las políticas de control del tabaco de la interferencia del tabaco, es fundamental en estos países.La integración del artículo 5.3 con el artículo 17 (i) reforzará la coherencia política, asegurando que las políticas de medios de vida alternativos no se vean perjudicadas por la interferencia de la industria tabacalera; (ii) fomentará la colaboración intersectorial al abordar tanto la interferencia de la industria tabacalera como el desarrollo de los medios de vida; y (iii) mejorará la rendición de cuentas y la transparencia en los esfuerzos de control del tabaco.
Addressing tobacco industry influence in tobacco-growing countries Raphael A Lencucha et al.tobacco industry interests.Realizing the transformational potential of Article 5.3 has proved highly challenging.